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By applying both that and the many worlds hypothesis, the idea of quantum immortality comes up, and thats a real mind bender. Its also a way to verifiably prove many worlds accurate(afaik the only way)

MWI only somewhat makes sense (it still doesn’t make much sense) if you assume the “branches” cannot communicate with each other after decoherence occurs. “Quantum immortality” mysticism assumes somehow your cognitive functions can hop between decoherent branches where you are still alive if they cease in a particular branch. It is self-contradictory. There is nothing in the mathematical model that would predict this and there is no mechanism to explain how it could occur.

Imagine creating a clone which is clearly not the same entity as you because it is standing in a different location and, due to occupying different frames of reference, your paths would diverge after the initial cloning, with the clone forming different memories and such. “Quantum immortality” would be as absurd as saying that if you then suddenly died, your cognitive processes would hop to your clone, you would “take over their body” so to speak.

Why would that occur? What possible mechanism would cause it? Doesn’t make any sense to me. It seems more reasonable to presume that if you die, you just die. Your clone lives on, but you don’t. In the grand multiverse maybe there is a clone of you that is still alive, but that universe is not the one you occupy, in this one your story ends.

It also has a problem similar to reincarnation mysticism. If MWI is correct (it’s not), then there would be an infinite number of other decoherent branches containing other “yous.” Which “you” would your consciousness hop into when you die, assuming this even does occur (it doesn’t)? It makes zero sense.

To reiterate though, assuming many worlds is accurate, the expiriment carries no risk to you. Due to the anthropic principle, you will always find yourself in the reality in which you survive.

You see the issue right here, you say the reality in which you survive, except there would be an infinite number of them. There would be no the reality, there would be a reality, just one of an infinitude of them. Yet, how is the particular one you find yourself in decided?

MWI is even worse than the clone analogy I gave, because it would be like saying there are an infinite number of clones of you, and when you die your cognitive processes hop from your own brain to one of theirs. Not only is there no mechanism to cause this, but even if we presume it is true, which one of your infinite number of clones would your cognitive processes take control of?

Isn’t the quantum communication (if it were possible) supposed to be actually instantaneous, not just “nearly instantaneous”?

There is no instantaneous information transfer (“nonlocality”) in quantum mechanics. You can prove this with the No-communication Theorem. Quantum theory is a statistical theory, so predictions are made in terms of probabilities, and the No-communication Theorem is a relativity simple proof that no physical interaction with a particle in an entangled pair can alter the probabilities of the other particle it is entangled with.

(It’s actually a bit more broad than this as it shows that no interaction with a particle in an entangled pair can alter the reduced density matrix of the other particle it is entangled with. The density matrix captures more than probabilities, but also the ability for the particle to exhibit interference effects.)

The speed of light limit is a fundamental property of special relativity, and if quantum theory violated this limit then it would be incompatible with special relativity. Yet, it is compatible with it and the two have been unified under the framework of quantum field theory.

There are two main confusions as to why people falsely think there is anything nonlocal in quantum theory, stemming from Bell’s theorem and the EPR paradox. I tried to briefly summarize these two in this article here. But to even more briefly summarize…

People falsely think Bell’s theorem proves there is “nonlocality” but it only proves there is nonlocality if you were to replace quantum theory with a hidden variable theory. It is important to stress that quantum theory is not a hidden variable theory and so there is nothing nonlocal about it and Bell’s theorem just is not applicable.

The EPR paradox is more of a philosophical argument that equates eigenstates to the ontology of the system, which such an equation leads to the appearance of nonlocal action, but this is just because the assumption is a bad one. Relational quantum mechanics, for example, uses a different assumption about the relationship between the mathematics and the ontology of the system and does not run into this.

Depends upon what you mean by “consciousness.” A lot of the literature seems to use “consciousness” just to refer to physical reality as it exists from a particular perspective, for some reason. For example, one popular definition is “what it is like to be in a particular perspective.” The term “to be” refers to, well, being, which refers to, well, reality. So we are just talking about reality as it actually exists from a particular perspective, as opposed to mere description of reality from that perspective. (The description of a thing is always categorically different from the ontology of the thing.)

I find it bizarre to call this “consciousness,” but words are words. You can define them however you wish. If we define “consciousness” in this sense, as many philosophers do, then it does not make logical sense to speak of your “consciousness” doing anything at all after you die, as your “consciousness” would just be defined as reality as it actually exists from your perspective. Perspectives always implicitly entail a physical object that is at the basis of that perspective, akin to the zero-point of a coordinate system, which in this case that object is you.

If you cease to exist, then your perspective ceases to even be defined. The concept of “your perspective” would no longer even be meaningful. It would be kind of like if a navigator kept telling you to go “more north” until eventually you reach the north pole, and then they tell you to go “more north” yet again. You’d be confused, because “more north” does not even make sense anymore at the north pole. The term ceases to be meaningfully applicable. If consciousness is defined as being from a particular perspective (as many philosophers in the literature define it), then by logical necessity the term ceases to be meaningful after the object that is the basis of that perspective ceases to exist. It neither exists nor ceases to exist, but no longer is even well-defined.

But, like I said, I’m not a fan of defining “consciousness” in this way, albeit it is popular to do so in the literature. My criticism of the “what it is like to be” definition is mainly that most people tend to associate “consciousness” with mammalian brains, yet the definition is so broad that there is no logical reason as to why it should not be applicable to even a single fundamental particle.

This problem presupposes metaphysical realism, so you have to be a metaphysical realist to take the problem seriously. Metaphysical realism is a particular kind of indirect realism whereby you posit that everything we observe is in some sense not real, sometimes likened to a kind of “illusion” created by the mammalian brain (I’ve also seen people describe it as an “internal simulation”), called “consciousness” or sometimes “subjective experience” with the adjective “subjective” used to make it clear it is being interpreted as something unique to conscious subjects and not ontologically real.

If everything we observe is in some sense not reality, then “true” reality must by definition be independent of what we observe. If this is the case, then it opens up a whole bunch of confusing philosophical problems, as it would logically mean the entire universe is invisible/unobservable/nonexperiential, except in the precise configuration of matter in the human brain which somehow “gives rise to” this property of visibility/observability/experience. It seems difficult to explain this without just presupposing this property arbitrarily attaches itself to brains in a particular configuration, i.e. to treat it as strongly emergent, which is effectively just dualism, indeed the founder of the “hard problem of consciousness” is a self-described dualist.

This philosophical problem does not exist in direct realist schools of philosophy, however, such as Jocelyn Benoist’s contextual realism, Carlo Rovelli’s weak realism, or in Alexander Bogdanov’s empiriomonism. It is solely a philosophical problem for metaphysical realists, because they begin by positing that there exists some fundamental gap between what we observe and “true” reality, then later have to figure out how to mend the gap. Direct realist philosophies never posit this gap in the first place and treat reality as precisely equivalent to what we observe it to be, so it simply does not posit the existence of “consciousness” and it would seem odd in a direct realist standpoint to even call experience “subjective.”

The “hard problem” and the “mind-body problem” are the main reasons I consider myself a direct realist. I find that it is a completely insoluble contradiction at the heart of metaphysical realism, I don’t think it even can be solved because you cannot posit a fundamental gap and then mend the gap later without contradicting yourself. There has to be no gap from the get-go. I see these “problems” as not things to be “solved,” but just a proof-by-contradiction that metaphysical realism is incorrect. All the arguments against direct realism, on the other hand, are very weak and people who espouse them don’t seem to give them much thought.